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INTRODUCTION
Obscurity defines the lives of most judges in the United States.
Judges run trials, issue orders, and write opinions. The media occa-
sionally reports on some high-profile case, but rarely focuses on the
individual judge who wrote the opinion, issued the order, or ran
the trial.1 There are exceptions, of course, such as the O.J. Simp-
son trial and the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in Bush v. Gore,
when the identities of the judges play a central role in accounts of
the cases. But for the most part judges are treated as interchangea-
ble cogs in a dispassionate justice system, and this seeming reluc-
tance to take account of the individual judge's role extends to most
academic discussions of cases that arise at any level other than the
Supreme Court. This remains true despite widespread agreement
in both the theoretical and empirical literature on judicial behavior
that the individual characteristics of a judge will at least sometimes
make a difference in determining the outcome of a case.
If obscurity defines the careers of most judges, notoriety de-
fines that of Judge Richard A. Posner of the Seventh Circuit Court
of Appeals. When his opinions are discussed, whether in an aca-
* Professors at New York University School of Law and Georgetown
University Law Center, respectively. Thanks for helpful conversations with Scott
Baker, Robert Blomquist, Devon Carbado, Edeanna Johnson, Ed Kitch, Kim
Krawiec, Jim Rossi, Michael Solimine, Larry Solum, David Vladeck, and Un Kyung
Park. Thanks also to Chris Kellett for excellent research assistance.
1. One of us used to ask the students in his Securities Regulation class every
year to fill out a note card listing, among other things, the names of five active
federal judges (not justices) whose cases the students had found interesting in
prior classes. The purpose of the exercise was to put together a set of cases that
the students would enjoy for the "recent cases" portion of the class. The justices
on the Supreme Court were explicitly excluded because the Court decides very few
Securities Regulation cases and all of the important ones are assigned to the stu-
dents anyway. Among the names that frequently showed up on the students' note
cards were Brennan, Holmes, Cardozo, Friendly, and Hand (all dead and, there-
fore, definitely not active); Rehnquist, Scalia, and O'Connor (alive, but all justices
on the Supreme Court); and Judy (apparently a judge on television). Needless to
say, the note cards did not serve their intended purpose. But it was interesting that
there was one name that made it onto 487 out of the approximately 500 note cards
that were filled out before we gave up handing them out: Judge Richard A. Posner.
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demic context or in the media, his name is likely to be invoked.
This notoriety is such that he has been profiled in the pages of the
New Yorker,2 debated Ronald Dworkin in the New York Review of
Books,3 excoriated the 9/11 Commission Report in the pages of the
New York Times Book Review,4 criticized the field of critical-race the-
ory in the pages of the New Republic,5 and used the opportunity of
delivering the Holmes lectures at Harvard Law School to condemn
the entire field of moral philosophy as producing work of little or
no value to legal analysis. 6 He has written best-selling books rang-
ing from his classic treatise on the economic analysis of law7 to
books covering sex, literature, aging, the federal courts, public in-
tellectuals, and moral philosophy, all the way to the Monica
Lewinksy affair.8
It is no news thatJudge Posner is ajudicial, academic, and me-
dia star. Whether they would agree with his ideas or not-and the
present authors would take exception with more than a few-most
academics would agree that Posner is one of the most creative
thinkers in the recent history of the legal academy. He is also one
of the fathers of the "law and economics" movement. Two decades
ago, this field occupied the margins of the legal academy; now,
thanks largely to the ubiquitous Posner, it dominates significant
portions. Posner's contributions to basic areas such as antitrust,
contracts, torts, discrimination, sexual harassment, evidence, intel-
lectual property, and judicial behavior (the list could go on) are
2. Larissa MacFarquhar, The Bench Burner, THE NEW YORKER, Dec. 10, 2001, at
78. There have, of course, been many other articles about Judge Posner (many of
which are nominally in the form of book reviews of something that Posner wrote,
but spend a good deal of time discussing Posner himself). See, e.g.,James Ryerson,
The Outrageous Pragmatism ofJudge Richard Posner, LINGUA FRANCA, May/June 2000,
at 26.
3. Emily Bazelon, Sounding Off, LEGAL AR., Nov./Dec. 2002, at 30, 31
(describing the debate between Posner and Dworkin in the pages of the New York
Review of Books).
4. Richard A. Posner, The 9/11 Report: A Dissent, N.Y. TIMES BOOK REV., Aug.
29, 2004, at 1.
5. Richard A. Posner, The Skin Trade, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Oct. 13, 1997, at 40.
6. Richard A. Posner, 1997 Oliver Wendell Holmes Lectures: The Problematics of
Moral and Legal Theory, 111 HARv. L. REv. 1637 (1998).
7. RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW (6th ed., 2003).
8. RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON (1992); RICHARD A. POSNER, LAW AND
LITERATURE (rev. and enlarged ed., 1998); RICHARD A. POSNER, AGING AND OLD
AGE (1995); RCHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CHALLENGE AND REFORM
(1996); RCHARD A. POSNER, PUBLIC INTELLECTUALS: A STUDY OF DECLINE (2001);
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE PROBLEMATICS OF MORAL AND LEGAL THEORY (1999);
RICHARD A. POSNER, AN AFTAIR OF STATE: THE INVESTIGATION, IMPEACHMENT, AND
TRIAL OF PRESIDENT CLINTON (1999).
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considered so foundational that they are often the starting point for
law school discussions of the topics, even where the professor is us-
ing Posner only as a foil to make her own point about how the
doctrine in question should be understood. Posner has also pro-
duced foundational scholarship in areas yet untapped by most legal
academics: what, for example, are the optimal regulatory responses
to epidemics such as AIDS and obesity?9
Why, given his creativity, notoriety, academic achievement, and
more than twenty years on the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
has Judge Posner not been elevated to the Supreme Court? A Su-
preme Court justice plays a very different role from that of a pro-
vocative academic or public intellectual. Would Posner's success on
the Seventh Circuit translate into a successful stint on the Supreme
Court? We don't know. Nevertheless, we argue that, given Posner's
long career as ajudge, data exists that can provide at least a starting
point to evaluate his fitness for the job of Supreme Court justice.
In a recent article, "Choosing the Next Supreme CourtJustice:
An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance" (referred to in this
essay as the "Choosing article"), we reported that Judge Posner far
outdid his judicial colleagues by almost every measure we used.10
We intended a simplistic empirical analysis, one that would, at best,
represent a first analysis ofjudicial performance at the circuit-court
level, an analysis that would invite further investigation. Our hope
was that by setting forth objective measures of what most people
would view as related to merit, we could place the burden on politi-
cians to explain in more detail the justifications behind the choices
of nominees to the Court.
Once confronted with a ranking based on objective character-
istics, we envisaged several ways politicians and others could look
behind the numbers to assess the true merits of a nominee. For
example, for any given high-scoring judge, what factors underlay
9. See ToMAsJ. PHILIPSON & RIcHARD A. POSNER, PRIVATE CHOICES AND PUBLIC
HEALTH: THE AIDS EPIDEMIC IN AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE (1993); Tomas Philip-
son & Richard A. Posner, Public Spending on AIDS Education: An Economic Analysis,
37J.L. & ECON. 17 (1994); TomasJ. Philipson & Richard A. Posner, The Long-Run
Growth in Obesity as a Function of Technological Change (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Re-
search, Working Paper No. 7423, 1999), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/
w7423.pdf.
10. See StephenJ. Choi & G. Mitu Gulati, Choosing the Next Supreme Court Jus-
tice: An Empirical Ranking of Judge Performance, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 23 (2004). Our
work stands on the shoulders of others who pioneered the empirical examination
of judicial performance including most prominently William M. Landes, Lawrence
Lessig & Michael E. Solimine, Judicial Influence: A Citation Analysis of Federal Court of
Appeals Judges, 27J. LEGAL STUD. 271 (1998).
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the high scores? Were the high scores really representative of ex-
traordinary performance or were they the result of luck? Did they
suggest a venal judge who successfully gamed the system or a judge
who in fact attempted to do justice, display judicial temperament,
and be fair?"1
In the present paper, we make a preliminary attempt to look
behind the numbers for Posner. What drives his high scores? What
does that tell us about him and his fitness for the high court?
For the active federal circuit-court judges during the 1998 to
2000 period who were still active as of 2003 (there were ninety-eight
of them), we report data drawn from our Choosing article on three
categories of judicial performance: productivity, quality, and inde-
pendence. We assume that the willingness to work hard, produce
high-quality work, and think and act independently are qualities
that the majority of people consider desirable. We term these
"widely held criteria." A politician who supports a particular nomi-
nee because of that nominee's narrowly held ideology (e.g., legislat-
ing school prayer) would find it difficult to convince the broader
public that the nominee was the best for the job if the nominee
scored near the bottom of our objective measures.
We intended the measures described in the Choosing article to
serve only as a starting point for our inquiry into the problem of
judicial merit. In the present essay, we attempt to determine what
these measures may reveal about Posner as a possible nominee to
the Supreme Court.
11. For discussions of what light empirical estimations of judicial perform-
ance at the circuit-court level can throw on a judge's fitness for the Supreme
Court, see Choi & Gulati, supra note 10; Daniel Farber, Supreme Court Selection and
Measures of Past Judicial Performance, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005, man-
uscript on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law); Larry Solum, A
Tournament of Virtue, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. Rv. (forthcoming 2005, manuscript on file
with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law); Richard A. Posner, Judicial Behav-
ior and Performance: An Economic Approach, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming
2005, manuscript on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law); David
Vladeck, Keeping Score: The Utility of Empirical Measurements in Judicial Selection, 32
FLA. ST. U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005, manuscript on file with the NYU Annual
Survey of American Law); Stephen J. Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, Which Judges Write
Their Opinions?, 32 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. (forthcoming 2005, manuscript on file with
the NYU Annual Survey of American Law). See generally Steven Gey & Jim Rossi,
Empirical Measures ofJudicial Performance: An Introduction to the Symposium, 32 FLA. ST.
U. L. REv. (forthcoming 2005, manuscript on file with the NYU Annual Survey of
American Law) (draft available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=614550) (reviewing
an array of articles on the topic of empirical research on judicial performance).





Federal circuit court judges face overwhelming case loads. As a
result, they are able to issue published opinions in only a small frac-
tion of cases. We regard the number of published opinions pro-
duced by a particular judge as a rough measure of the amount of
effort that judge has expended in the judicial process. Ajudge who
publishes more opinions, other things held equal, probably exerts
more effort or possesses greater skill at writing. Obviously, this is a
rough measure, since there are many other factors that determine
publication rates: the circuit's case load, the kinds of cases that the
judge hears, the judge's seniority level, etc. In Table 1, taken from
the Choosing article, we report the top ten judges in our sample
based on productivity.1 2
Table 1: Published Opinions Written from 1998-2000
(for the ten judges with the highest number of
published opinions)
(A) Total Number (B) Total Number
of Published of Published
Judge Opinions Majority Opinions (C) Circuit
Richard Posner 269 254 7
Frank Easterbrook 233 213 7
Joel Flaum 202 192 7
Diane Wood 194 173 7
Kenneth Ripple 182 151 7
Michael Kanne 177 176 7
Morris S. Arnold 175 152 8
John Coffey 168 162 7
James B. Loken 167 147 8
Roger L. Wollman 158 154 8
Summary Statistics for (A) (n=98): Mean = 98.1; Median = 85.5; Standard Deviation = 42.8;
Kurtosis = 2.501; Skewness = 1.418.
Summary Statistics for (B) (n=98): Mean = 83.6; Median = 74.0; Standard Deviation = 41.5;
Kurtosis = 2.918; Skewness = 1.576.
Table 1 reveals a wide margin between Judge Posner and the
others. In a three-year period, Posner published 269 opinions,
whereas the mean number of published opinions for the 98 active
judges in our sample was 98.1. Even Easterbrook, the judge with
the second-highest number of published opinions, published forty
fewer opinions during this period. What explains this? Does Pos-
ner spend all his time writing opinions or forcing his clerks to write
12. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 10, at 44.
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opinions? Or does he simply publish rubbish while his colleagues
publish high-quality material?
Other than an article published in the New Yorker and a week-
long diary that he kept for the online magazine Slate,'3 we lack de-
tailed personal knowledge of how Posner spends his workday. We
do know that he spends at least some time doing things other than
writing opinions. He writes multiple books and articles every year,
regularly teaches classes at the University of Chicago, participates in
the faculty workshops and lunchtime roundtables at the University
of Chicago Law School, and gives multiple workshops and lectures
around the country; and those are only the activities that we know
about as outsiders. As of this writing, he had even begun, along
with Gary Becker, a blog site. 14 What is going on?
We investigated this question in the course of research for a
paper that examined judicial authorship. 15 In that paper, we re-
ported that Posner scores highly on several objective measures de-
signed to assess the likelihood that a judge writes his own judicial
opinions.16 Informal discussions with former law clerks and mem-
bers of the judiciary confirmed this result: Posner apparently writes
every single word of his opinions-not most words or the majority
of words, but every single word! And it must be borne in mind that
this feat of authorship is accomplished in the context of a federal
judiciary where most judges are not writing books and articles,
13. See MacFarquhar, supra note 2; Richard Posner, Diary, SLATE, Jan. 14-18,
2002, at http://slate.msn.com/?id=2060621 &entry=2060676.
14. Gary Becker & Richard Posner, THE BECKER-POSNER BLOC, at http://
www.becker-posner-blog.com (last visited Apr. 5, 2005). Judge Posner has also
been a guest blogger on sites such as the one run by Lawrence Lessig. Richard
Posner, Lessig Blog Archives: Richard Posner Guest Entries, LESSIG BLOC, at http://
www.lessig.org/blog/archives/posner.shtml (last visited Apr. 5, 2005).
15. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 11.
16. See id. In the authorship paper, we first examined a number of "generic"
tests of authorship drawn from computational linguistics. We failed, however, to
control for subject matter of the opinion and this led to spurious results. We also
examined a number of tests more tailored for the judicial context that are more
robust in respect to subject-matter differences across opinions. Using these more
robust tests, we found that Posner consistently scored in the top 10 in terms of self-
authorship ofjudicial opinions. See id. (manuscript at 40-51). Our results must be
accompanied by two caveats however. First, our robust tests may in fact not be
measuring authorship. If this is the case then the fact that Posner scores highly is
meaningless. Indeed, we start from the presumption that Posner writes his own
opinions (based on informal inquiries among members of the judiciary) and use
this to calibrate the effectiveness of our authorship tests. Second, more precise
tests that explicitly control for subject matter of opinions are nonetheless required
if we are to make more definitive statements with respect to who authors their own
opinions.
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teaching classes, sitting by designation on the district court, and giv-
ing workshops, yet are reputed to delegate large portions of the
opinion-writing task to their law clerks. What is more shocking is
that Posner uses only two of the four law clerks to which he is enti-
tled. 17 Apparently, he does not have enough work for four clerks.
And even those two clerks are said to have relatively little to do.' 8
Seven of the top ten publishers of opinions sit on the Seventh
Circuit. This raises the possibility that there is some kind of higher-
than-average publishing norm on the Seventh Circuit. Perhaps the
credit for the high publication numbers is at least partially attribu-
table to the circuit itself, such that to the extent Posner gets special
credit, it should only be to the extent that he publishes more than
his colleagues on the circuit.19
In an earlier paper, one of us reported a comparison between
the Seventh Circuit's publication rates and those of the Third Cir-
cuit (another circuit with a relatively unremarkable docket) at the
time Posner joined the Seventh Circuit.20 The Third Circuit rates
remained relatively flat while there is a sharp upward trajectory in
the Seventh Circuit just as Posner became a judge.2' Did Posner
cause the jump, or was there some other external factor at work?
In the course of presenting our objective measures of judicial
performance at workshops around the country, we heard a variety
of stories about the "Posner effect" on the Seventh Circuit's produc-
17. In 2003, he began using three law clerks (apparently, as an experiment to
see whether there would be any value to having an additional member of the
chambers).
18. Much the same appears to be true forJudge Easterbrook, who also man-
ages to teach, write multiple articles a year, and do all his own writing with the use
of only two clerks to provide research assistance. One interesting difference be-
tween Posner and Easterbrook appears to be that while Posner does ask his law
clerks to help him with background research, Easterbrook seems to do much of his
own research in addition to doing all of his own writing (that is, all but the one or
two opinions a year that he might allow his law clerks to draft). And that raises the
puzzle of what exactly it is that Easterbrook's clerks do. That question perhaps will
be answered by whoever tries to unpack the Easterbrook data.
19. We also ranked the circuit-court judges in our sample, while controlling
for intercircuit differences. Under this control, we adjusted the mean number of
publications in each circuit to be identical. Rankings therefore turned on how far
away a particular judge is from the mean publication number for her particular
circuit. Even under this alternate measure of productivity, Posner again ranks first
among all the judges in terms of productivity. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 10, at
46.
20. Mitu Gulati & Veronica Sanchez, Giants in a World of Pygmies? Testing the
Superstar Hypothesis with Judicial Opinions in Casebooks, 87 IowA L. Rtv. 1141,
1180-81 (2002).
21. Id.
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tivity. All of the stories started with the anecdote that Posner, hav-
ing quickly dealt with all the cases that he had been assigned, was
bored. He could have turned to his articles or books or teaching.
But he had just become a judge and wanted to do more judging-
related tasks. So he went to the chiefjudge at the timeJudge Cum-
mings, explained that he was underworked, and asked if he could
be assigned some additional cases. 22 At this point, the stories start
to diverge. Some versions say that Posner began taking cases from
his colleagues and writing opinions for them. Other versions have
Posner simply being assigned more of the cases, especially those,
such as some of the motions and habeas cases, that did not gener-
ally require oral argument. Still other versions say that his col-
leagues were outraged and annoyed, felt that he was trying to show
them up and, while ostracizing him from their social gatherings,
began to work harder themselves.
The real story is more mundane. Posner did go to Judge Cum-
mings and offer to do additional work. But Cummings explained
that there was a strict norm on the circuit that all the active judges
were assigned the same number of cases. The only way that Posner
could be assigned additional cases was to do cases at the district
court level. Posner did (and still does) sit by designation every year
at the district court level. 23 And while he was not initially successful
in increasing his case load at the Seventh Circuit, his persistence in
producing high-quality published opinions (as opposed to unpub-
lished opinions) did eventually result in the other judges on the
circuit also increasing the numbers of their published opinions.
22. We report the mildest version of this anecdote (and, based on our limited
ability to verify, the one most likely to be true). In some of the versions that we
have heard, Posner not only asks to be assigned additional cases, but actually starts
doing that additional work, and then, not finding that enough, asks for even more.
23. Posner appears to find the dynamics of sitting as a trial judge (and the
question of why judges in many cases seem to work so hard to prevent certain
issues from going to trial) fascinating. Put differently, he seems to think that one
cannot get a meaningful understanding of the posture of a case on appeal without
understanding the dynamics at the lower court level. Unfortunately, we have not
been able to gather comparative data on how many times the different circuit
judges sit by designation on the district courts. But, anecdotally, our sense is that
most circuit judges rarely sit as district court judges. That said, many circuit
judges, unlike Posner, had extensive trial court experience in their prior careers
and probably don't need to sit as a trial court judge to understand the dynamics
there. Nevertheless, this information would be relevant to those who think that
Posner is less qualified for the Supreme Court because he lacks trial court experi-
ence. If the data demonstrates that he does sit extensively at the trial court level,
perhaps this critique of Posner could be removed.
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We are aware of no sudden change in the caseload of the Sev-
enth Circuit that corresponds to the increase in publication rates
that can be observed at the time Posnerjoined the circuit. Posner
therefore appears to be at least partially responsible for the increase
in productivity of published opinions on the Seventh Circuit.
II.
QUALITY
Judicial opinions are a type of product and the "customers" for
this product include other judges, legal academics, and lawyers.
The products all have the same price (essentially zero for legal aca-
demics and judges) and, as a result, customers do not make choices
based on price. We infer that choices are made based on quality.
As a rough measure of the quality ofjudicial opinions, we use a
variety of citation counts. Citation counts are a measure of the level
of use of the product and indirectly, therefore, quality. Of course
judges do not all decide the same case. They produce different
types of products, not just products of different qualities. A judge
who writes a securities law opinion may receive fewer citations than
a judge who writes an opinion dealing with the Constitution. Nev-
ertheless, we assume that over a long period of time, as judges write
across a number of different substantive areas of law, such differ-
ences will even out.24
Table 2 reports a snapshot of citation scores for a variety of
measures taken from our Choosing article. 25 We look at (A) the to-
tal number of outside-circuit citations, defined to include citations
from circuit courts outside of a judge's home circuit, state court
citations, and U.S. Supreme Court citations. We also look at (B)
the number of citations by the U.S. Supreme Court as well as (C)
the number of citations by law reviews and periodicals. Lastly, we
look at (D) the number of times a judge cites to her own opinions
(self-citations). Landes, Lessig, and Solimine suggest that judges
who write more of their opinions engage in more self-citations (due
to their greater familiarity with their own self-authored opinions).26
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25. See Choi & Gulati, supra note 10, at 50.
26. See Landes et al., supra note 10, at 274.
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Table 2: Citations to Opinions Published from 1998-2000
(for the ten judges with the highest total number of
outside citations)
(A) = Total Outside Circuit Citations; Z(A) = Z-Score of normalized (A)
(B) = SCT Citations; Z(B) = Z-Score of normalized (B)
(C) = Law Review and Periodical Citations; Z(C) = Z-Score of normalized (C)
(D) = Self-Citations; Z(D) = Z-Score of normalized (D)
(E) = Circuit
Judge (A) Z(A) (B) Z(B) (C) Z(C) (D) Z(D) (E)
Richard Posner 1406 2.61** 16 2.31** 1033 2.41* 392 2.35** 7
Frank Easterbrook 1340 2.52** 14 2.11"* 790 1.83 257 1.95* 7
Sandra L. Lynch 1023 1.99** 5 0.62 684 1.52 178 1.60 1
Bruce M. Selya 949 1.85 3 -0.04 727 1.65 364 2.28** 1
PaulJ. Kelly 799 1.51 0 -2.29** 388 0.30 103 1.07 10
Michael Kanne 768 1.44 4 0.32 512 0.90 181 1.61 7
Joel Flaum 743 1.37 3 -0.04 613 1.29 126 1.27 7
Kenneth Ripple 730 1.34 4 0.32 545 1.03 168 1.54 7
Diane Wood 678 1.20 3 -0.04 513 0.90 127 1.27 7
Harvie Wilkinson II 662 1.15 4 0.32 648 1.41 23 -0.36 4
** Indicates a Z-Score of 1.96 or higher (representing a two-sided probability of <5% for a
normal distribution). The Z-Score provides a statistical measure of the distance of a
particular data point from the mean. Outside circuit citations measured to May 31, 2003.
Normalized (A) is equal to LN(Total Outside Circuit Citations). Normalized (B) is equal to
LN(I+SCT Citations). Normalized (C) is equal to LN(Law Review and Periodical Citations).
Normalized (D) is equal to LN(Self Citations).
Summary Statistics for (A) (n=98): Mean = 417.3; Median = 383.0; Standard Deviation =
229.5; Kurtosis = 5.028; Skewness = 1.795.
Summary Statistics for normalized (A) (n=98): Mean = 5.903; Median = 5.948; Standard
Deviation = 0.515; Kurtosis = 0.025; Skewness = -0.020.
Summary Statistics for (B) (n=98): Mean = 3.837; Median = 4.000; Standard Deviation =
2.757; Kurtosis = 4.583; Skewness = 1.547.
Summary Statistics for normalized (B) (n=98): Mean = 1.410; Median = 1.609; Standard
Deviation = 0.616; Kurtosis = 0.438; Skewness = -0.657.
Summary Statistics for (C) (n=98): Mean = 374.2; Median = 375.0; Standard Deviation -
172.0; Kurtosis = 1.408; Skewness = 0.992.
Summary Statistics for normalized (C) (n=98): Mean = 5.822; Median = 5.927; Standard
Deviation = 0.464; Kurtosis = -0.497; Skewness = -0.148.
Summary Statistics for (D) (n=98): Mean = 56.51; Median = 30.50; Standard Deviation -
69.05; Kurtosis = 9.287; Skewness = 2.807.
Summary Statistics for normalized (D) (n=98): Mean = 3.508; Median = 3.418; Standard
Deviation = 1.049; Kurtosis = 0.509; Skewness = -4.149.
Judge Posner is at the top for all of these measures. 2 7 He is
cited more by his colleagues on the Seventh Circuit, by other circuit
judges, by law professors, and by the Supreme Court. More striking
27. One possible objection to our various measures in Table 2 is that Posner
enjoys an advantage due to his productivity. A judge who writes 500 opinions will
have more citations compared with ajudge who only writes 100 opinions. To con-
trol for the productivity effect, we looked at the average number of outside-circuit
citations per opinion as well as the total number of outside-circuit citations to the
twenty opinions by each judge that received the most outside-circuit citations.
While Posner is the fourth-highest ranking judge in terms of the number of
outside-circuit citations to his top twenty opinions, he does not place in the top 10
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than the variety of measures on which Judge Posner out-performs
his colleagues is the degree by which he out-performs them. Apart
from his Seventh Circuit colleague, Frank Easterbrook, no one else
comes close.
Are Posner's opinions really that much better than everyone
else's? Or is there some underlying dynamic that produces the illu-
sion of a difference in quality? We attempt to unpack the data in
four ways that address these questions: (A) by determining the ex-
tent of Posner's dominance by most of the citation measures (what
we call the "superstar effect"); (B) by identifying the nature of those
opinions that garner a large number of citations; (C) by identifying
any biases among judges who cite Posner; and (D) by considering
whether high citation counts are the product of a "citation game"
among judges.
A. The Superstar Effect
Posner has more than three times the number of outside-cir-
cuit citations than the average judge in our sample of ninety-eight
active circuit-court judges. Even if Posner writes better-argued or
more elegantly phrased opinions than most of his judicial col-
leagues, surely he is not fourteen times better than those at the low
end of the scale or more than three times better than those at the
mean?28
As Dan Farber points out, the distribution of outside-circuit ci-
tations (and many of the other citation count distributions) is
skewed.29 Most judges are bunched together at the lower end of
the distribution and a few outliers, such as Posner, dominate the
higher end. Farber suggests that there may be a superstar effect at
play. 30 Since the price of using a particular opinion is the same
regardless of the quality of the opinion, every customer has an in-
for the average number of outside-circuit citations per majority opinion. See Choi
& Gulati, supra note 10, at 53.
As an additional measure of opinion quality we looked at the number of times
a particular judge was not only cited but also "invoked." An invocation involves a
reference to the cited judge by name-something we took as a special sign of re-
spect for the judge and the judge's particular opinion. Posner again ranks highest
in terms of both total invocations as well as average invocations per opinion. Id. at
60.
28. Karen Henderson of the DC Circuit received the lowest number of
outside circuit citations (109 citations) in our sample. See id. at 94-99.
29. See Farber, supra note 11 (manuscript at 17, 22).
30. Id.
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centive to use the best opinion.31 This will be so even if the second-
and third-best opinions are only slightly inferior to the best one.
The best opinions will capture the lion's share of the citations and
all the other opinions on the same subject will capture very few.
One therefore needs to be cautious in interpreting the large cita-
tion differences between Posner and the others as an indication of
the magnitude to which Posner's opinions are better than those of
the others.
Large differences in citation counts can also be produced by
small initial differences in factors such as prior reputation (with
which someone like Posner came to the bench endowed).3 2 In
other words, the judge receiving the largest number of citations
might not be the best opinion writer. Citation measures may be
significant indicators, but we must exercise caution in reaching con-
clusions based on citation numbers alone. Farber nonetheless
points out that there are other measures, such as the number of
law-review citations and the number of outside-circuit citations to a
judge's top twenty opinions, that do seem to be normally
distributed.33
B. Opinions Garnering Numerous Citations
In this section, we will examine those Posner opinions that are
cited most frequently. There are at least two questions as to which
we hope to gain preliminary insights. First, are Posner's citations
the results of extensive discussions of basic (and trivial) matters
such as the standard of review? Almost every judicial opinion, as a
matter of course, contains a discussion of the standard of review.
So, the judge who invests a great deal of resources into writing a
good description of the standard of review might obtain a large
number of cites. But, from a social point of view, her resources
might be better spent deciding cases and providing explanations
for her decisions, rather than coming up with flowery descriptions
31. We are here talking about the nominal price. The real price differs be-
cause it takes into account opportunity costs and the opportunity costs of using a
bad (that is, one that is unclear or inadequately explained) opinion will presuma-
bly be higher than those of using a good opinion.
32. Larry Solum also makes this point, albeit in slightly different terms than
Farber. Farber refers to both the literature on superstar economics and network
effects, whereas Solum focuses on the latter. See Solum, supra note 11 (manuscript
at 16). Our understanding is that the underlying dynamics of the two stories are
slightly different, although the end result in both cases is the explication of a dy-
namic where initial difference in endowments of luck or prior reputation can re-
sult in dramatic differences in final outcomes.
33. See Farber, supra note 11 (manuscript at 21).
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of the standard of review that are more likely to be cited. A higher
number of citations for providing the best discussion of the stan-
dard of review might therefore not be a good indicator of fitness for
the Court. On the other hand, if the citations were for elegant solu-
tions to highly complex questions (that is, cutting proverbial Gor-
dian knots), we might suspect such solutions to have merited
citation.
The second question has to do with the types of cases for which
Posner obtains his citations. Since the question at issue is fitness for
the Supreme Court, the question arises whether his citations are
primarily in the types of cases that the Court does not handle.
Given that his fame as an academic is primarily the result of his
insights about common law cases and those other areas that most
directly implicate economic analysis-in such areas as torts, con-
tracts, antitrust, corporations, securities regulation-perhaps those
are the types of cases where he gets his citations. And those are not
the types of cases that dominate the Court's docket. Conversely,
maybe he does not get cited for his discussions of how to interpret
complex federal statutes; the types of questions that do dominate
the Court's docket.
As a preliminary step towards the painstaking research that
such an inquiry would entail, we looked at the subjects of Posner's
twenty most-cited opinions, as reported below in Table 3.
Table 3: Subject Matter of Posner's Top 20 Published Opinions
Receiving Outside Citations Reported From 1998-2000
Subject Matter of the Opinion # Opinions
Applicability of the federal habeas corpus statute 4
Administrative law (involving the NLRB and Social Security 2
Administration respectively)
Diversity jurisdiction suit-contract law-related issue 2
Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) 2
Equal Protection Clause-§ 1983 action 2
Americans with Disabilities Act 1
Class action involving Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations 1
Act (RICO)
Class action involving the Truth in Lending Act, Illinois Consumer 1
Fraud and Deceptive Business Practices Act, and Illinois Uniform
Deceptive Trade Practices Act.
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 1
Act (CERCLA)
Criminal law (federal narcotics charges) 1
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Subject Matter of the Opinion # Opinions
Family and Medical Leave Act, Pregnancy Discrimination Act, and Fair 1
Labor Standards Act
Federal Communications Act 1
Title VII, Americans with Disabilities Act, and Age Discrimination in 1
Employment Act
Posner's most-cited opinions are not on basic procedural or
substantive legal points. For that matter, nor do they arise out of
corporate, securities, or antitrust cases. The latter category of cases
do not tend to dominate the Supreme Court's docket, although
one might expect them to attract the attention of someone like Pos-
ner with a background in law and economics. Instead, among the
twenty most-cited Posner decisions, the largest concentration of
cited opinions is on the applicability of the federal habeas corpus
statute. The next largest concentration of opinions deals with ER-
ISA, the review of administrative agency decisions (the NLRB and
Social Security Administration), and the Equal Protection Clause.
Note, however, that two of Posner's opinions are diversity jurisdic-
tion opinions dealing with issues related to contract law. Among
the remaining opinions are decisions dealing with a number of
complex federal statutory schemes, including RICO, CERCLA, and
Title VII. At least from our preliminary analysis, most of Posner's
top citation garnering opinions are in the types of cases that the
Supreme Court handles. And the citations do not appear to be the
product of discussions of basic procedural questions such as stan-
dards of review. To the contrary, Posner's opinions appear remark-
ably bereft of the routinely extensive discussions of matters such as
the standard of review that other judges seem to regard as
necessary.
C. Bias
Posner may receive more than his fair share of citations for
reasons unrelated to the quality of his judicial opinions. It may be,
for example, that judges with a background in academia tend to
write in an especially provocative and pedagogic fashion. This style,
as opposed to substance, might generate high citation numbers.
Putting aside the difficult question of whether style can be sepa-
rated from substance when determining the quality of an opinion,
it seems worthwhile examining whether an academic bias has fa-
vored the citation of Posner's opinions.
A quick perusal of citations reveals that a number of former
academics-Posner, Easterbrook, Wood, Moore, and Wilkinson-
do extremely well on a number of the measures. Tracey George's
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empirical 2001 study34 allows us to look further at the performance
of the nine academics in our sample whom she identifies as such.
George's empirical study, based on a somewhat different data set,
suggests that academics perform differently than the rest of their
judicial colleagues in a variety of ways, including citation counts,
publication practices, and reversal rates.35 Table 4 below describes
the nine academics' performance on our citation-count measures:
Table 4: Citations for Academic Judges for Opinions Published
from 1998-2000
(C) Outside-Circuit
(A) Total Outside-Circuit (B) SCT Citations to Judge's
Judge Citations Citations Top Twenty Opinions
Posner 1406 16 570
Easterbrook 1340 14 667
Wood, D. 678 3 327
Wilkinson 662 4 425
Bowman 573 4 371
Calabresi 566 7 371
Sloviter 403 5 277
Cabranes 396 1 229
Arnold, M.S. 369 6 188
AcademicJudges are those judges in our dataset with a prior academic career as identified
in Tracey George, Court Fixing, 43 ARiz. L. Rav. 9 (2001).
Summary Statistics for (A) (n=98): Mean = 417.3; Median = 383.0; Standard Deviation =
229.5; Kurtosis = 5.028; Skewness = 1.795.
Summary Statistics for (B) (n=98): Mean = 3.837; Median = 4.000; Standard Deviation =
2.757; Kurtosis = 4.583; Skewness = 1.547.
Summary Statistics for (C) (n=98): Mean = 277.9; Median = 256.5; Standard Deviation =
121.2; Kurtosis = 2.608; Skewness = 1.382.
Academic judges, as a group, generally score above the mean
on the three citation counts that we looked at. That said, Table 4
also suggests that the Posner and Easterbrook numbers are driven
by something other than academic background alone. For exam-
ple, for the first two measures-outside-circuit citations and Su-
preme Court citations-Posner and Easterbrook have nearly double
the number of citations attained by the academic who ranks third
in the table. And on the third measure, outside-circuit citations to
each judge's top twenty opinions, Posner has almost 250 more cita-
tions than the judge in third position. While academics do seem to
do better than the mean on these citation measures, academic
34. Tracey E. George, Court Fixing, 43 ARIz. L. REV. 9 (2001). George limits
her analysis to only certain types of opinions (e.g., en banc opinions, opinions with
an academic judge on the panel, etc.) and only certain circuits. See id. at 47, 51.
35. See id. at 43-54.
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background alone does not seem to explain the Posner and Easter-
brook numbers.3 6
Another source of bias that may affect citation counts is the
political affiliation of the citing judges. Do Republicans cite other
Republicans more? Do they cite famous Republicans even more
than ordinary Republicans? Is there some Republican conspiracy to
ensure that Posner is at the top of the rankings? Research suggests
both (a) that ajudge's party of appointment does seem to influence
a variety ofjudicial outcome variables 37 and (b) that citation scores
often reflect hidden biases such as informal citation clubs where
like-minded folks cite each other.38
To test the claim of political bias, we look at the citations to
Posner's opinions by the other judges in our sample of ninety-eight
active circuit-court judges. If citations occur along party lines, then
we hypothesize that the rate at which Posner is cited by Republican
appointees should be substantially higher than the rate at which he
is cited by Democratic appointees. Table 5 categorizes the ninety-
seven other active circuit judges in our sample as to political affilia-
tion by the political party of the president who nominated each and
reports the number of times each judge cited a Posner opinion writ-
ten from 1998 to 2000.
36. It is not clear to us why a particular measure should be deemed problem-
aticjust because it favors certain people more than others. The very idea of merit
is based on the premise that some will do better than others. If the measure favors
academics because academics produce higher quality products, then the measure
is capturing exactly what it is meant to capture. The problem instead seems to be
one of possible bias in those suggesting the measure (that is, the two authors of
this essay). It looks suspicious when two academics suggest a measure of merit that
seems to favor academics over others. And there is a large literature on self-serving
biases that suggests that there may be a problematic dynamic at work here. We
hope not in this case, but it is possible. For a critique of our treatment ofjudicial
merit, see Patrick S. Shin, Judging Merit, 78 S. CAL. L. Rzv. 137 (2004). See also
Michael J. Gerhardt, Merit vs. Ideology, 26 CARDozo L. REv. 353 (2005) (discussing
whether merit can be defined separately from ideology in the judicial appoint-
ments process).
37. See Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts of Appeals: A
Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. REv. 301, 305 (2004); Richard L. Revesz, Environ-
mental Regulation, Ideology, and the D.C. Circuit, 83 VA. L. REv. 1717, 1719 (1997).
38. There is an extensive body of work in economics and elsewhere that ex-
amines patterns of citations as a means to study the evolution of ideas. Among the
findings in this literature have been those of citation clubs or clusters where those
at the same institution or within the same theoretical cluster tend to cite each
other more. On the subject, see George Stigler & Claire Friedland, The Citation
Practices of Doctorates in Economics, 83J. POL. ECON. 477 (1975) (finding evidence of
citation clusters). For more recent findings, see Kenneth W. Clements & Patricia
Wang, Who Cites Vhat?, 79 ECoN. REC. 229 (2003).
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Table 5: Outside Circuit Court Judges Citations to Posner
from 1998-2000
Democrat- Republican-
Appointee Judge Circuit Citations Appointee Judge Circuit Citations
Lynch 1 8 Selya 1 5
Cabranes 2 1 Torruella 1 5
Calabresi 2 2 Boudin 1 7
Parker 2 0 Jacobs 2 2
McKee 3 1 Walker, Jr. 2 3
Sloviter 3 1 Scirica 3 3
Rendell 3 2 Alito 3 4
Michael 4 1 Nygaard 3 0
Motz 4 2 Roth 3 0
Benavides 5 1 Widener 4 1
Dennis 5 1 Niemeyer 4 2
Stewart 5 3 Wilkinson 4 2
King 5 5 Williams 4 3
Martin, Jr. 6 1 Wilkins 4 0
Daughtrey 6 0 Luttig 4 0
Moore 6 2 Davis 5 1
Clay 6 3 Garza 5 1
Cole 6 3 Jones 5 1
Gilman 6 4 Barksdale 5 2
Murphy 8 2 Higginbotham 5 2
Hawkins 9 1 Jolly 5 2
Pregerson 9 2 Smith 5 3
Schroeder 9 2 Wiener 5 0
Reinhardt 9 3 DeMoss 5 0
Tashima 9 3 Batchelder 6 1
Thomas 9 0 Boggs 6 4
Briscoe 10 1 Bowman 8 1
Lucero 10 2 Loken 8 1
Murphy 10 2 Wollman 8 2
Henry 10 4 Arnold 8 3
Seymour 10 7 Kelinfeld 9 1
Hull 11 1 Nelson 9 1
Barkett 11 2 Trott 9 2
Marcus 11 3 O'Scannlain 9 6
Anderson III 11 0 Kozinski 9 0
Edwards DC 1 Rymer 9 0
Rogers DC 1 Tacha 10 1
Tatel DC 1 Kelly 10 2











Note first that there is no significant difference between Demo-
crat- and Republican-nominated judges. Both groups range from 0
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to a maximum of 8 citations to Posner for the time period. Demo-
crats cited Posner an average of 2.10 times over the three-year pe-
riod; Republicans cited Posner 1.96 times (two-sided t-test of the
difference of the means = 0.359: statistically insignificant). Indeed,
89.7% of the Democratic judges cited to Posner at least once dur-
ing the 1998 to 2000 time period. Only 77.6% of the Republican
judges cited to Posner at least once during the same period. If any-
thing, Democratic judges are more inclined to cite Posner than Re-
publican judges.
In addition, we may gain insight by examining the distribution
of citations to Posner. If the distribution of citations to Posner
opinions across different judges outside the Seventh Circuit has a
flat pattern (low kurtosis), we may conclude that the judges view
Posner roughly in the same manner. (Given Posner's high overall
citation count, this is presumably a positive view.) If instead, the
distribution curve of citations to Posner opinions across the differ-
ent outside-circuit judges has a thick center or multiple peaks, this
supports the view that Posner is viewed differently by the various
judges, with some viewing him a great deal more positively than
others. The kurtosis for the distribution of citations to Posner by all
judges is 2.00, indicating a relatively flat distribution.
We also collected two years of data on whom Posner himself
cited from 1997 to 1998. 3 9 If there is a high correlation between
the citations by Posner and the citations to him, this would suggest
the potential for some kind of reciprocal dynamic (that is, I will cite
you if you cite me). Excluding Seventh Circuitjudges, Posner cites
to at least one opinion written from 1997 to 1998 for 86.1% of our
active circuit-courtjudges. Posner, however, is not as uniform in his
citation practice as the others are to him. The ten judges receiving
the most citations by Posner account for over 40% of the total num-
ber of citations to outside-circuit opinions in our sample that Pos-
ner makes during the time period. The kurtosis measure for the
distribution is 22.4 (indicating a peaked distribution). Posner plays
decided favorites in whom he cites (despite the relatively even num-
ber of citations he receives from the active circuit judges as re-
ported in Table 5 above). Table 6 details the top ten judges cited
by Posner from 1997 to 1998, excluding judges from the Seventh
Circuit. In a sense; this might be seen as Posner's ranking of the
judges outside his circuit (although, to say anything meaningful on
that point, we would have to look at a larger number of years).
39. The 1997 to 1998 time period corresponds to a new study for which we
are currently collecting data pertaining to the citation patterns of federal circuit
court judges.
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Table 6: Top 10 Judges Cited by Posner Outside of the
Seventh Circuit
Total Citations
Party Judge Cited Circuit by Posner
R Selya 1 44
R Wilkinson 4 28
D Edwards D.C. 17
R Boggs 6 12
R Boudin 1 12
D Calabresi 2 11
R Higginbotham 5 11
R Smith 5 10
R Ebel 10 9
R Wollman 8 9
D. Understanding the Citation Game
Among other topics, Posner has written on the question of ju-
dicial greatness and how to measure it empirically. Posner has eval-
uated the careers of both Cardozo and Learned Hand in statistical
terms and has used citation analysis in both instances. 40 In addi-
tion, he has written on citation analysis itself.4 ' All of this suggests
that Posner has thought about the question of what kinds of opin-
ions are likely to get cited more. And given his intellectual abilities
and the fact that he does get cited so much more than almost any-
one else, it is not a big jump to infer that he may have figured out
how to win the citation game.
Suppose for argument's sake that Posner in fact does tailor his
opinions to generate more citations. This fact alone does not mean
that his citation counts are not valid measures of quality. To reach
the latter conclusion one would have to specify the types of citations
that are invalid and the types that are valid. One might decide, for
example, that citations to lengthy expositions on basic procedural
issues that everyone already understands (but that always require a
citation) should not be counted, whereas clear expositions of com-
plex issues that heretofore were not understood well should be
counted. Such an analysis of citation type would, of course, be sub-
jective. But an empirical test could be run, as we have done some-
what crudely in Table 3 above, which listed the subject matter of
40. See RIcHARD A. POSNER, CARDozo: A STUDY IN REPUTATiON 74-91 (1990);
Richard A. Posner, The Learned Hand Biography and the Question ofJudicial Greatness,
104 YALE LJ. 511, 534-40 (1994) (book review).
41. See Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of the Use of Citations in the Law,
2 AM. L. & ECON. REv. 381 (2000).
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the twenty Posner opinions that received the most citations from
1998 to 2000. Our sense from reading a considerable volume of
Posner opinions is that his opinions are valued more for the latter
type of analysis-clear exposition-than the former. This, how-
ever, is a question worth examining in further detail.
III.
INDEPENDENCE
We used two measures of independence in our Choosing article.
First, we looked at the number of dissents and concurrences that a
judge wrote.42 Writing a dissent or concurrence takes time and ef-
fort. Moreover, a dissent or concurrence puts the authoring judge
in opposition to the majority opinion judge. A willingness to write
dissents or concurrences therefore provides an indication of a
judge's independence. Such a measure is, of course, imperfect. A
measure of the number of dissents and concurrences may track
cantankerousness and unwillingness to compromise as opposed to
real independence.
Second, in our Choosing article, we looked at the number of
times ajudge was in opposition to another judge of the same politi-
cal party (as proxied by the political party of the president who
nominated the judge). We termed this the "ideological bias" mea-
sure.43 Opposing opinions included both the dissents that a judge
writes and the dissents that are written against thatjudge. We then
developed an "expected" dissent rate againstjudges of the same po-
litical party if a judge simply dissented against (or was dissented
against by) other judges on the same circuit at random. If 90% of
the other judges on the circuit were Republican, we would expect
90% of the opposing opinions to be against a Republican judge.
To determine independence, we looked at the differential between
the actual dissent rate against judges of the same political party and
the expected rate. Table 7, taken from the Choosing article, reports
on the two independence measures. 44
42. Choi & Gulati, supra note 10, at 62.
43. Id. at 63.
44. Id. at 108-12.
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Table 7: Number of Opposing Opinions and Independence
Ratings for the Period 1998-2000
(twenty judges with best independence ratings)
(A) = Independence Rating
(B) = Number of Dissents and Concurrences
(C) = Adjusted Dissents and Concurrences for Inter-circuit Differences
Z-Score
Judge (A) (B) (C) for (C) Circuit
David M. Ebel 0.000 12 25 0.16 10
R. L. Anderson III 0.000 10 24 0.06 11
Michael J. Luttig -0.006 19 26 0.35 4
Samuel A. Alito -0.015 18 29 0.65 3
Carl E. Stewart -0.017 2 10 -1.49 5
E. Grady Jolly -0.018 10 18 -0.56 5
Juan R. Torruella -0.018 10 27 0.44 1
Diane Wood -0.018 21 27 0.44 7
Richard Posner 0.019 15 21 -0.26 7
Edward Earl Carnes -0.022 14 28 0.53 11
AnthonyJ. Scirica -0.023 2 13 -1.22 3
Mary M. Schroeder 0.023 5 5 -2.12"* 9
Terrence Evans 0.024 18 24 0.09 7
Harold R. DeMoss, Jr. 0.024 30 38 1.78 5
Daniel Manion 0.028 20 26 0.33 7
Merrick B. Garland -0.037 3 15 -1.01 D.C.
Frank Easterbrook -0.042 20 26 0.33 7
Sandra L. Lynch -0.043 7 24 0.09 1
Stephen Trott -0.044 19 19 -0.49 9
Joel Flaum -0.044 10 16 -0.84 7
** Indicates a Z-Score of 1.96 or higher (representing a two-sided probability of <5% for a
normal distribution). The Z-Score provides a statistical measure of the distance of a
particular data point from the mean. The number of dissents and concurrences for each
judge is adjusted so that the mean number of total dissents and concurrences for each circuit
is identical and equal to 23.167 (the unadjusted mean number of total opinions for the
Ninth Circuit).
Summary Statistics for (A) (n=98): Mean = -0.062; Median -0.057; standard deviation =
0.189; Kurtosis = 0.307; Skewness = 0.307.
Summary Statistics for (B) (n=98): Mean = 14.469; Median = 13.00; standard deviation =
9.692; Kurtosis = 1.344; Skewness = 1.042.
Summary Statistics for (C) (n=98): Mean = 23.170; Median = 22.869; standard deviation =
8.557; Kurtosis = 0.796; Skewness = 0.646.
The independence measure based on sheer number of dis-
sents and concurrences is the one measure by which Posner does
not score exceptionally well. His dissents and concurrences are not
statistically different from the mean. 45
On the independence measure based on our metric of ideolog-
ical bias Posner scores ninth-highest out of the ninety-eight
judges.46 However, a close look at the data may lead us to question
Posner's high showing in the ideological bias measure of indepen-
45. Id.
46. Id.
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dence and serve to underline the highly preliminary nature of the
tests in our Choosing article. Looking at the top ten judges receiving
outside circuit citations from Posner in Table 6 above, we see that
Posner displays a preference for citing Republicans. While 56% of
our sample of active circuit judges consists of Republicans, eight of
the ten judges cited most frequently by Posner are Republican. Of
the other judges, Posner cites at least once to 97.5% of the Republi-
can-nominated judges while citing to only 71.4% of the Democratic-
nominated judges (two-sided t-test of the difference between means
= 3.38: significant at the 1% level). On the other hand, aside from
citations to Selya, Wilkinson, and Edwards (a Democratic-ap-
pointee), the number of citations by Posner ranges fairly narrowly
from 0 to 12.
The relatively small number of dissents and concurrences au-
thored by Posner is also surprising to those of us who are more
familiar with his academic identity. As an academic, he has always
been something of a provocateur. The dissent data suggests the
possibility that Posner's judicial identity may differ from his aca-
demic identity: he may not be quite as provocative a judge as an
academic. In addition, the low dissent rate suggests that Posner
gets along quite well with his judicial colleagues. There does not
appear to be any real animosity between him and any of his col-
leagues on the circuit.
To assess whether Posner has shown a consistent pattern of in-
frequent dissent against his colleagues, we examined his dissents
over the course of his career. Table 8 provides summary data on
the number of dissenting opinions and total opinions over Posner's
career to 2000.4 7
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Table 8: Posner's Dissents Over Time
Year Total Opinions Dissents Dissent Rate
1982 78 6 7.7%
1983 81 9 11.1%
1984 76 7 9.2%
1985 89 9 10.1%
1986 78 5 6.4%
1987 79 3 3.8%
1988 70 5 7.1%
1989 74 3 4.1%
1990 86 5 5.8%
1991 73 5 6.8%
1992 80 5 6.3%
1993 97 3 3.1%
1994 100 1 1.0%
1995 89 3 3.4%
1996 103 2 1.9%
1997 88 1 1.1%
1998 82 2 2.4%
1999 92 5 5.4%
2000 78 3 3.8%
Early in his judicial career, Posner appears not to have been as
collegial and to have dissented far more frequently. For his first
four full years on the Seventh Circuit, the number of dissenting
opinions he wrote averaged 9.6% of the total number of his opin-
ions. For the four years ending in 2000, the number of dissenting
opinions accounted for only 3.2% of the total number of Posner's
opinions (two-sided t-test of the difference between means = 4.17:
significant at the 1% level). There may be other explanations, of
course, for this drop in dissent rate. It may be that all judges tend
to dissent more frequently early in theirjudicial career.4 8 The com-
position of judges in the Seventh Circuit may have shifted over the
course of Posner's career towards judges more sympathetic to Pos-
ner's views, thus leading to fewer dissents. Our summary numbers
on Posner's dissent rate over his career therefore remain only a pre-
48. The so called "freshman effect" that has been discussed in some of the
political science literature works the other way, suggesting that judges are more
reluctant to dissent early in their careers (especially as freshmen) but dissent more
as they gain confidence. For an inquiry into the various factors that determine
separate opinion writing, including the freshman effect, see Virginia A. Hettinger
et al., Separate Opinion Writing on the United States Courts of Appeals, 31 AM. POL. REs.
215, 235-36 (2003).
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liminary attempt to examine both Posner's independence and his
collegiality. 49
CONCLUSION: SHOULD POSNER BE ON THE
SUPREME COURT?
This brief study cannot establish beyond doubt that Posner
should be on the Supreme Court. We would assert that knowing a
judge's propensity to work hard, ability to write high-quality opin-
ions, and willingness to stand up to colleagues are all important for
the assessment of judicial merit. Because Posner does so much bet-
ter on most of those measures than everyone else, we ask why he
isn't at least on the President's short list. We concede, however,
that such objective measures only begin to scratch the surface of
key questions, such as a judge's propensity to be fair, do justice,
exercise judgment, and demonstrate judicial temperament. None-
theless, if someone has been a judge for more than twenty years, as
is the case with Posner, there is ample data from which to make
further inferences on the merits of that judge. Such an investiga-
tion will require more work than we have done so far, work that
may well be justified in view of the importance of Supreme Court
appointments. 50 Data and transparency in the evaluative process
are important if we (the outsiders to the nomination and confirma-
tion process) do not fully trust the rationales put forth by the deci-
sion makers in power (the president and the Senate). The more
objective measures of merits we can obtain, the greater the burden
we can place on politicians to reveal their true-perhaps narrowly
held and ideological-motivations in championing a particular
judge as a nominee to the Supreme Court.
We end with a final note about Judge Posner that might pro-
vide further insight into the question of his fitness for the High
Court. We suspect that Posner himself does not think that he
should be on the Supreme Court. The Supreme Court, as Posner
explained in a recent article in the Florida State University Law Re-
49. For a more detailed inquiry into Judge Posner's pattern of dissents over
his career that also observes the declining fraction of dissents, see Robert F. Blom-
quist, Dissent, Posner-Style: Judge Richard A. Posner's First Decade of Dissenting Opinions,
1981-1991-Toward an Aesthetics of Judicial Dissenting Style, 69 Mo. L. REv. 73
(2003).
50. Some of this work has already been done by scholars like Robert Blom-
quist. Blomquist's painstaking deconstruction of Posner's dissents, for example,
sheds light on Posner's ability to show compassion. Robert F. Blomquist, Judge
Posner's Dissenting Oeuvre and the Aesthetics of Canonicity (Mar. 2005) (unpub-
lished manuscript, on file with the NYU Annual Survey of American Law).
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view, is a highly political body.51 A key component of the Court's
function is to determine how to finesse high-profile, high-volatility
cases such as Bush v. Gore. The job of a Supreme Court justice may
therefore be better suited for those with a political background and
the willingness and ability to negotiate and build consensus, while
at the same time taking the pulse of the public and its willingness to
accept change. We suspect that the implicit message in his Florida
State University Law Review piece is that the foregoing job descrip-
tion does not fit him all that well. Yet doubt remains. It is probably
true that the Supreme Court would be dysfunctional if it comprised
nine clones of Posner. But as David Vladeck, one of our critics,52
said to us (perhaps tongue in cheek): "What about one? Things on
the Supreme Court would surely be a lot more interesting with Pos-
ner on it."
51. See Posner, supra note 11 (manuscript at 24). See also Richard A. Posner,
The Anti-Hero, THE NEW REPUBLIC, Feb. 24, 2003, at 27, 30 (book review) (expres-
sing the view that the Supreme Court is a highly political body, with a legislative-
like function).
52. For an exposition of his criticisms, see Vladeck, supra note 11.
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